Abstract: This article investigates the new attitude toward the reception and use of
Introduction
The reception of Augustine is virtually synonymous with the intellectual history of the west. As such it has had its peaks and valleys. It is, however, a history that is still being written. 1 Whereas scholars have revealed a renaissance of Augustine scholarship in the fourteenth century, 2 the thirteenth century has not been seen as a major period in "Augustinianism," aside from the abstract, and ahistorical, dichotomy of Augustinianism and Aristotelianism in the high medieval schools. 3 If we desire to understand the so-called late medieval Augustinian renaissance, we can only do so in context of that which came before, namely, the "pre-renaissance" reception of Augustine in the thirteenth century. A comprehensive treatment of "predominates and sets an exegetical tone," 13 though for the "mystical senses," "the sources are usually other than Augustine, and include selections from Isidore of Seville, the Venerable Bede and, occasionally, Jerome."
14 Augustine also played a major role in the glosses on Deuteronomy, Joshua, Judges, Ruth, 1-4 Kings, 1-2 Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Tobit, Judith, Ester, and Psalms. He had relatively less influence for the other Old Testament books. For the New Testament, Augustine was important for the glosses on the Gospels of Mark, Luke, and John, together with Acts, but, surprisingly, was unimportant for both Paul's letters and the other books of the New Testament. 15 Nevertheless, the Glossa ordinaria offered scholars substantial portions of Augustinian texts. So much so that Ann Matter could claim that, if we can come to an understanding of Augustine's appropriation for the Glossa, together with that of the other patristic authors, we will have gained the key for understanding "the secrets of the medieval Latin tradition of biblical exegesis." 16 These three texts represent a high point in Augustine's reception, forming the textual foundations, together with the recovery of Aristotle, of the origins of scholasticism. Yet, for the most part, in Lombard, Gratian, and the Glossa, Augustine was excerpted and used; he was not used as the textual foundation in any analytical sense. While Augustine was a normative authority, 17 none of these authors went beyond the compilatory. However, in the later twelfth century and on into the thirteenth, we find a new attitude toward Augustine and his texts that would provide the basis for the new source erudition with respect to Augustine that is evident in the fourteenth-century Augustinian Renaissance. 18 This new attitude is aptly illustrated by two case studies, the late twelfth and early thirteenth-century Cistercian, Helinand of Froidmont, and the Oxford scholar, Robert Grosseteste. While very distinct in terms of careers, Helinand and Grosseteste demonstrate a shift in Augustine's reception, contributing to the transition from the twelfth-century Augustinian Renaissance, to that of the later Middle Ages. If Lombard can be seen as the culmination of the earlier period of Augustine's reception, as in so many ways he was, then, in the wake of Lombard's achievement, we find in the early thirteenth
E. Ann Matter, "The Church Fathers and the Glossa ordinaria," in The Reception of the Church
Fathers in the West, ed. Backus, 1:83-111; 86. 14. Ibid., 87. 15. Ibid., 88-108. 16 . Ibid., 109; see also Andrée, "Glossa ordinaria," 1055-1057 (n.8). 17. On the issue of "normative authority," see Saak, The Impact of Augustine, forthcoming (n.4). century the beginnings of a renewed reception of Augustine, the impact of which was to have far-reaching consequences.
Helinand
Not much is known about the life of Helinand. He was born around 1160 in the region of Beauvais, and died sometime after 1229. Of noble origin, Helinand studied with the pupil of Abelard, Ralph of Beauvais, and then pursued the life of a trouvère, before undergoing a conversion around 1182 and entering the Cistercian monastery at Froidmont. Helinand was the author of the well-known vernacular Les Vers de la Mort, and became a renowned preacher. 19 Moreover, in the early thirteenth century, Helinand set his hand to composing an encyclopedic world chronicle, his Chronicon.
While Romance literature offered social commentary on the author's contemporary world, encyclopedic literature attempted to present a summation of knowledge. There was, however, no single genre or form of encyclopedic literature. What unified medieval "encyclopedias" was the compilatory nature of the work. Universal chronicles formed a genre of encyclopedic literature that sought to present an interpretation of and commentary on the past for the author's or compiler's present in attempt to preserve knowledge. As the thirteenth-century chronicler Guillaume de Nangis stated in the prologue to his Chronicon:
Since the deeds of times past are infinite and there are very many recorders of history indeed, so that they are not able to be had or read by all, it is not in vain that I have taken charge to collect together a few things from the infinite and to bring them together into one compendium which is prepared and completed for the pleasure of its readers. 20 After discussing his approach, and how he would draw from Jerome's translation of Eusebius for the history of the earliest times, as well as from Sigibert of Gembloux for the later, Guillaume announced that he would add other things to these accounts, which, even if recorded by others, he would compose in a new order and way, and .htm, and "Hélinand de Froidmont," Arlima, http://www.arlima.net/eh/helinand_de_froidmont .html, both of which give extensive bibliography on Helinand. 20. Guillaume de Nangis, Chronicon, Paris, BnF MS lat. 4917, fol. 1 r : "Cum infinita sunt temporum gesta gestorumque digestores quam plurimi nec possint ab omnibus uel haberi uel legi non inutiliter duxi ex infinitis pauca colligere et in unum coartare compendium que legentibus oblectamentum pariant et profectum." 6 that he would also compile other things from his own time. 21 Thus, for Guillaume, the past was to be preserved and brought "up to date" by the compilation of a compendium of knowledge for the enjoyment and education of his audience. It was this aspect of the universal, world chronicle that led Jacques Le Goff to consider the universal chronicle as the "model encyclopedia for history."
22
The thirteenth century was the height of medieval encyclopedic endeavors. That era saw the compilation of such classic medieval encyclopedias as the Dominican Thomas of Cantimpré's Liber de natura rerum (1230-1245), the Franciscan Bartholomeus Anglicus's De proprietatibus rerum (1242-1247), and the Dominican Vincent of Beauvais's Speculum maius (1250) . 23 Yet, before these classic works appeared, that is, during the years 1211-1223, precisely the period in which vernacular historiography in France began to flourish, 24 Helinand set his pen to writing a compilatory world chronicle in Latin, which became a major source for Vincent of Beauvais's Speculum Maius, 25 and represents what Le Goff called the "encyclopedic spirit" of the later twelfth and early thirteenth century. Moreover, scholars have repeatedly emphasized the importance of the Cistercians for the intellectual history of the period that is often-albeit inadequately-labeled "early scholasticism." 26 Thus Helinand's Chronicon is an invaluable source for intellectual life in the early thirteenth century: it is a window onto a world that is often ignored, caught as it is between the more attractive themes of St. Bernard on the one end, and the rise of the universities on the other. Helinand's Chronicon is a sort of map of this terra incognita and, as such, has much to tell us not only about medieval historiography, but also about the creation, functions and uses of texts in the high Middle Ages, including those of Augustine.
One of the major challenges facing the interpreter of Helinand's Chronicon is that of interpreting medieval compilations as such, whereby the majority of the words present in the Chronicon are excerpted from other scholars. 27 Helinand's Chronicon is highly intertextualized. Consonant with medieval grammatical culture, it forms a textual pastiche, whereby, in the words of Martin Irvine, "the resulting collection forms an interpretive arrangement of texts." 28 The interpretative nature of the Chronicon, however, surpasses that of mere emplotment. Delisle argued:
Hélinand belonged to a school which had for a principle not to confuse original parts of an account with borrowings added on to the more ancient authors. He held to the rule to cite his authorities and he took care to place the word auctor at the beginning of phrases or paragraphs for which he would take responsibility. 29 Yet, on closer investigation, Helinand's Chronicon appears very different from Delisle's description. The auctor notation, pace Delisle, appears in the text as a scribal designation rather than as an authorial self-identification, thus testifying to Seán Burke's statement that "text and author are united under the signs of their disunion." 30 No rule for citing authorities can be found that systematically and clearly differentiates between Helinand's own words and those of his sources. Moreover, Helinand nowhere spoke of the gesta temporum, and whereas Guillaume de Nangis, Vincent of Beauvais, Bartholomeus Anglicus, and Thomas of Cantimpré all described their own works as compilations and their own activity as one of compiling, Helinand used other verbs. It is not the verb compilare that Helinand used, but adnotare, excerpere, excipere, explicare, exponere, and tractare. In short, Helinand's Chronicon stands at the beginnings of a development in medieval literary theory of compilatio whereby "to compile" underwent a change in the later thirteenth and fourteenth century from a derogatory description of someone else's work to a proud self-designation of writers' own activity as being one not of narration but of compilation.
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Helinand's Chronicon is a historical work that seeks to re-emplot, by means of the textual power exerted in the mode of compilation, 32 the textual traditions of the received historia in keeping with a Cistercian religious program. 33 This program was designed to educate Cistercians in the best knowledge of the day, including natural philosophy, biblical scholarship, and theology, to combat heresy in society (such as the Cathars) and dangerous approaches to knowledge that were being followed in the new universities. Helinand's Chronicon is a Cistercian "textbook" that reveals the religious and intellectual climate of late twelfth and early thirteenth-century Europe, when the Cistercian Order was struggling to maintain its religio-political dominance in the face of the challenges posed by the rise of the universities and the newly established Franciscan and Dominican Orders. Helinand's on-going endeavor to construct his work is evident by the "genre-bending" of the text, whereby it assumes the form at times of a biblical commentary, at times of a catalogue of exempla for preaching (and indeed Helinand in places incorporated his own sermons into his Chronicon), and at other times that of a formal academic treatise. Hence its encyclopedic nature and its scope. It thus serves as an excellent case study for the reception and use of Augustine in encyclopedic literature.
By the time Helinand began to write his Chronicon, he had a vast store of Augustinian material at his disposal, one that far surpassed the early medieval florilegia, such as Prosper of Aquitaine's Sententiae and Eugippius's Excerpta ex operibus s. Augustini. 34 In some ways, this fact gets at the central problem: Lombard's Sentences, Gratian's Decretum, and the Glossa were themselves compilations, and, when seen as such, should put Helinand's endeavor in broader perspective than when Helinand is viewed simply as an exceptor who was intent on putting together a medieval encyclopedic text. One of the defining characteristics of the fourteenth-century Augustinian renaissance was the source erudition with respect to Augustine's works, whereby scholars, predominately but not exclusively members of the OESA, were 37 Here Helinand included a long digression on the nature of angels and demons, drawing most of all on Augustine. Chapters 48 through 71 form a continuous line of argument, constructed from ciu. 8-10. Continuous indeed, but it is so not simply following along copying Augustine's text; rather, Helinand "cuts and pastes" his source to create a new order and line of argument, in short, he creates a new text, much as a collage or a quilt is a new work made from old materials. In chapter 60 Helinand begins with ciu. 10.2, then moves in chapter 61 to ciu. 10.26. In chapter 62 he begins with summarizing ciu. 9.7, before moving then back to book 10 and chapter 21. He continues with 10.21 at the beginning of chapter 63, right where he had left it, more or less, and continues in this fashion, following fairly closely Augustine's text up until chapter 66, where we find a prime example of "cut and paste." In chapter 66, Helinand begins with ciu. 10.23 for the first phrase of his first sentences, before then summarizing 6 lines of Augustine with six words, and then includes an insert of the Greek patricum noym from ciu. 10.28. But then Helinand continues. Still working on chapter 66, he then moves from ciu. 10.23 to 10.24, but then, after a direct quote of two lines, Helinand continues by summarizing the nine lines of Augustine that immediately preceded the one he had just quoted, working backwards in Augustine's text, so to speak. He then returns to direct quotation where he had been before his inverted insert, and continues in a "forward" direction following Augustine's text through chapter 67, before jumping to ciu. 10.27 in chapter 68. Then he continues along with 10.28 and 10.29, before jumping back with no warning in the middle of chapter 68 to ciu. 10.9, which then continues in chapter 69 through chapter 71, except for the fact that Helinand once again works "backwards" in chapters 70 and 71, citing increasing earlier parts of ciu. 10.9. Clearly, Helinand is creating a new text here, one pieced together from Augustine. In no way is he "simply" copying Augustine. Such a composite text cannot be attributed to the manuscript tradition of ciu., nor is such an arrangement extant in the florilegia. One can only conclude that Helinand was constructing 37. For further details, cf. the Appendix to this article.
his text from scratch, so to speak, and he did so based on a thorough and intimate knowledge of ciu.
38
In his sermons, Helinand appealed to Augustine less frequently than he did in his Chronicon. Nevertheless, it appears that, for the most part, when he did so Helinand was citing Augustine directly. In sermo 7, Helinand cites Contra Faustum (c. Faust.) twice, the first time from c. Faust. 17.6 and the second, from 19.13.
39
While c. Faust. was a well-known text and often excerpted, circulating not only in complete manuscripts but also in condensed versions, 40 these two specific passages are extremely rare. C. Faust. 17.6 was not excerpted; it seems that Helinand's citation is the first (medieval) citation of this passage. 41 Moreover, in the same sermon, Helinand cited from s. 187, followed by a further citation to s. 136. 43 Helinand is also the first author to cite these two passages; they were not previously excerpted. Thus Helinand could only have cited these passages if he had access to the text itself.
Such examples as the ones given above could easily be multiplied. I have not, however, checked every Augustine citation in Helinand's works, and there are certainly cases when Augustine is cited because it is in the source Helinand was excerpting, such as in book three, chapter twenty where Helinand simply "cut and pasted" from Lombard's Sentences. 44 Sic enim ait in retractatione eiusdem libri: Illud quod dixi omnes artes animam secum attulisse michi uideri nec aliud quicquam esse id quod dicitur discere quam reminisci et recordari non sic accipiendum est quasi ex hac approbertur animam uel hic in alio corpore uel alibi siue in corpore siue extra corpus aliquando uixisse et ea que interrogata respondet cum hoc non didicerit in alia uita ante didicisse fieri eim potest sicut iam in hoc opere supra diximus ut hec ideo possit quia natura intelligibilis est ut connectatur non solum intelligibilibus sed eciam immutabilibus rebus eo ordine facta ut cum se ad eas res mouet quibus connexa est uel ad se ipsam in quantum eas uidet in tantum de hiis uera respondeat nec sane omnes artes eo modo secum attulit ac secum habet nam de artibus que ad sesnsus corporis pertinent sicut multa medicine sicut astrologie omnia nisi quod hic didicit that of his erudition with respect to classical sources, 47 while also surpassing that of his twelfth-century forbearers. Thus Helinand appears as the first thirteenth-century author to demonstrate the level of scholarly erudition that foreshadowed the source erudition that became the hallmark of the fourteenth-century Augustinian Renaissance. Yet, he did so without the personal appropriation of Augustine as the model for the religious life.
48 While Helinand did report in his Chronicon the second translation of Augustine from Sardinia to Pavia, drawn from Bede, 49 and noted that the canonical life had been established by the apostles and then reestablished by Augustine, 50 there is no evidence that Helinand saw Augustine as anything more than as a doctor of the Church. Moreover, there is no indication that Helinand attempted to follow the teachings of Augustine. He used Augustine, but cannot be said to have imitated Augustine, or tried to compose his work in "thinking with" Augustine. 51 Nevertheless, Helinand represents a transition in the medieval reception of Augustine from the Augustinian Renaissance of the twelfth century to that of the fourteenth century. As a result, Helinand has much to reveal regarding Augustine's reception with respect to his erudition with regard to the texts he cites, as well as with respect to the limits of his and his age's knowledge, use, and appropriation of Augustine.
non potest dicere ea uero que sola intelligencia capit, propter id quod dixi cum uel a se ipsa uel ab alio fuerit bene interrogata ac recordata respondet. hec Augustinus." Cf. retr. 
Grosseteste
In turning from the still relatively obscure figure of Helinand of Froidmont, to the well-known Robert Grosseteste, introductions can be dispensed with.
52 Suffice it to say that Grosseteste, as one of the major intellectual figures of the first half of the thirteenth century, had, in the words of James McEvoy, "read very widely in the works of Augustine and imbibed his spirit."
53 As such, Grosseteste was more "Augustinian" than was Helinand. Yet we find the same, or at least a similar, use of Augustine evident in Grosseteste's Hexaemeron as we did with Helinand's Chronicon. 62 Moreover, the reference to Augustine Grosseteste gave in Hexaemeron 11.5.4 is most likely taken from De Genesi ad litteram (Gn. litt.). 63 The editors also note as other possible sources for the Hexaemeron, the Principia dialectice (dial.), qu. uet. t., and Sermo ad fratres in eremo 44. With regard to the passages where the editors cite the qu. uet. t. and the sermo as possible sources, Grosseteste did not cite Augustine; again the reference is given simply for parallels. 64 The reference to dial. is a bit more complex. Grosseteste's text reads as follows: "Ipsa enim materia, ut dicit Augustinus, est mutabilitas rerum mutabilium, capax formarum omnium in quas mutantur res mutabiles." 65 The editors first give the reference to s. 214.2, which reads: "Illa enim quae dicitur informis rerum ma-teries, formarum capax et subiecta operi Creatoris." 66 The passage the editors cited as an alternative, uel potius, from the dial. reads: "Informis materia est mutabilitas mutabilium rerum capax omnium formarum." 67 Yet the text that is closer to that of Grosseteste is John Scotus Eriugena's De diuisione naturae 3: "Ita enim definitur materia est mutabilitas rerum mutabilium capax omnium formarum."
Grosseteste's
68 Eriugena had first discussed this formulation in book one, where he ascribed it to a conflation of Plato's Timaeus and conf. 69 Eriugena therefore leads us back to the source, namely conf. 12.6: "mutabilitas enim rerum mutabilium ipsa capax est formarum omnium in quas mutantur res mutabiles." 70 Here, Grosseteste must not have been drawing directly from Augustine since none of the other possible sources included the last phrase "in quas mutantur res mutabiles," a detail that escaped the editors' attention. The point here is not to criticize the editors for having missed this reference, but to point to the difficulty in charting Augustine's reception even when using the best modern critical editions. Given Grosseteste's extensive knowledge of Augustine, it may be rather a surprise to note that Augustine had a very limited role in Grosseteste's commentary on Aristotle's Physics. Composed for the most part between 1228 and 1232, Grosseteste's is the first known commentary on the Physics, the origins of which are most likely to be placed during his teaching the Arts at Oxford in the first decade of the thirteenth century, though they could stem from the time of his chancellorship at Oxford from 1214 to 1221, or during his time as principle lecturer to the Oxford Franciscans from ca. 1229 to his assuming the bishopric of Lincoln in 1235. 71 Grosseteste mentioned Augustine only five times in the entire commentary, and did not cite any particular text of Augustine. Aristotle, on the other hand, is referenced throughout, just as one would expect. Yet, Grosseteste did not rely heavily on the works of previous scholars, a detail that permits one to argue that Augustine, the only patristic author cited, was indeed Grosseteste's "most important source," since he is the most frequently cited post-classical authority in Grosseteste's commentary. Grosseteste cited Averroes four times, Avicenna three times, the "Pythagoreans" three times, and Zeno and Richard of St. Victor twice, though Plato is mentioned seven times. Twice Grosseteste combined the authority of Plato and Augustine once regarding number, equating number and wisdom in the divine mind, 73 and once regarding the infinity of wisdom and the eternal reasons of things (raciones rerum eterne). 74 He then referenced Augustine with regard to the Trinitarian structure of perfected reason 75 and again with regard to time, relating time in Augustine to memory. 76 The source of his discussion is conf. 11.26.32-34, which he then related to conf. 11.21.26, though without discussion of Augustine's concept of distentio animae, reducing Augustine's detailed analysis of time and time and memory to time being a measure of motion (mensura motus) and an affection left in the soul from the passing of things (affeccio relicta in anima ex transitu rerum mobilium). Grosseteste's own position is far closer to that of Aristotle than to that of Augustine, 77 and he certainly does not evidence a thorough knowledge of Augustine in this commentary. Moreover, Augustine is not present at all in Grosseteste's Commentary on the Posterior Analytics. 78 Whereas Grosseteste used Augustine as his primary authority for his theological work, a close study of his appeals to Augustine's authority reveals that he did not have a major influence on Grosseteste's philosophical work.
The lack of Augustine in works of philosophy, at least to a certain extent, was a common feature of the high and later Middle Ages. This is particularly with respect to the Aristotelian tradition. 79 Even before the complete incorporation of Aristotle into the university curriculum, Augustine's impact on natural philosophy was limited, a fact evidenced in the Salernitan Questions, the editor of which, Brian Lawn, claims that, as a whole, the Salernitan Questions "are representative of the physica taught in the schools at the period ca. 1200." 80 According to Lawn, Augustine is mentioned only once when reference is made to ciu. 21.4. 81 Lawn notes Augustine as a possible source, together with others, in eleven additional loci, with nine references to ciu. and two to trin. Aristotle is mentioned only twice, 82 though with seventeen citations as a possible source and an additional fifty-seven citations of pseudo-Aristotle.
The prevalence of Aristotle is more evident in John Blund's Tractatus de Anima, dating to the first decade of the thirteenth century during Blund's regency in Arts at Oxford. 83 Though Augustine is cited as an authority, Aristotle was Blund's primary guide. Blund cited Augustine nine times, only three of which give specific reference: once to ciu., lib.arb., and trin., though the reference to trin. is actually to conf. 10.11.18. 84 Three of the remaining six references to Augustine combine the authority of Augustine and Aristotle, demonstrating their agreement 85 ; another reference combines the authority of Augustine and Jerome, together with aliis auctoribus to prove that the soul, existing in the body, is oppressed by the flesh, 86 which is then followed by a quotation from Aristotle's Posterior Analytics; Blund then draws on the authority of Boethius and Augustine, and others, that free will is stronger (magis uiget) in angels than in humans 87 ; and the final citation to Augustine is his presentation of Plato's opinion of the world soul, which Blund claims Augustine neither affirmed nor denied, a position that is evident, as the editors point out, in Augustine's De consensu euangelistarum (cons. eu.) 1.23.35; in Blund's opinion, the world soul is nothing other than the vivifying and ruling of the Holy Spirit. 88 The editors have noted an additional thirty instances where Augustine was a likely source, though he remained uncited. 89 Blund's use of Augustine contrasts markedly with that of Aristotle, whom Blund cited explicitly forty-two times, with an additional 125 instances as an uncited source. Aristotle, not Augustine, was Blund's principle authority for his treatment of the soul, though Blund seems to have endeavored to bring in Augustine's authority, blending it with his basically Aristotelian approach.
A more thorough and detailed knowledge of Augustine than is evident in Grosseteste's Physics commentary or Blund's commentary on De Anima is seen in Thomas Aquinas's Quaestiones de Anima. These were a series of disputed questions held most likely in Paris in the second half of the academic year 1268-1269, during Thomas's second sojourn in Paris. 90 Here Thomas cited Augustine thirty-three times, the most frequently cited authority after Aristotle with 144 citations. Plato is in third place regarding frequency of citation with sixteen, followed by PseudoDionysius with twelve and Averroes and Avicenna each with six. Moreover, Thomas cited from eleven works of Augustine, 91 with reference to Gn. litt. the most frequent with eight citations, followed by trin. with seven, and ciu. with six. He routinely gave book references for ciu., Gn. litt., and trin., and only six times did Thomas reference Augustine without giving a title. Moreover, Thomas exhibited a detailed knowledge of Augustine, as seen in question nineteen, whether a sensitive power remains in separated souls, when Thomas responded to the sixth argument pro based on Gn. litt. 12 92 by arguing that Augustine had retracted this position in his retr., and Thomas then quoted the passage. 93 Likewise in question twenty-one, dealing with the issue of whether separated souls can suffer punishment from corporeal fire, the nineteenth argument pro cited Gn. litt. 12 to affirm that the substance of souls in hell are not believed to be corporeal, but spiritual, 94 to which Thomas replied that Augustine stated such in the sense of inquiry, not in that of determining a question, and in any case he had revoked such an opinion in ciu. 21. 95 Further, Thomas referenced the pseudo-Augustinian De spiritu et anima three times, each of which he warned his reader that it was not a work of Augustine, 96 and in question twelve, suggested it was authored by "some Cistercian," 97 which we know it was, Alcherius
Claravellensis. Even in a philosophical work such as his Quaestiones de Anima, the "Aristotelian" Thomas demonstrated his erudition with respect to Augustine's works, which served as Thomas's primary authority after Aristotle.
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The inferred dichotomy between "Aristotelianism" and "Augustinianism" has shaped portrayals of thirteenth-century philosophy for over a century. Scholars from De Wulf and Gilson to Steven Marrone have, with considerable variation in terms of characterizing and demarcating the possible subdivisions of these two general categories, including the influence of Jewish and Muslim thought, which, at times, results in an additional third "school" of Latin Averroism, all regard scholastic philosophy to be generally divisible into these two, or three, philosophical schools, with the Aristotelians represented most stereotypically by Albert the Great and with the Augustinians represented by Aquinas, Bonaventure, John Pecham, and Henry of Ghent. 99 Yet the historical validity of such bifurcation, when one analyzes in detail the arguments of the scholastics, should be called into question based on the recognition that the labels are rarified terms employed by philosophers, theologians, and historians to describe historical phenomena that may or may not have had anything to do at all with the historical, or received, Aristotle or Augustine.
Other scholars have resisted the seduction of such categorization. Dales, in his study of the rational soul in the thirteenth century, asserted that he was not "concerned with classifying writers . . . or in determining whether they were Avicennists, Augustinians, or Aristotelians-indeed, they were all indebted to some degree to all three of these auctoritates," 100 and in his study of the question regarding the eternity of the world, Dales concluded that he did not see that there is anything to be gained by referring to our authors as Augustinians or Aristotelians in this matter. All authors cited and used both authorities extensively, and I have found no one who accepted intact the thought of either, a circumstance which was intensified by the custom of citing snippets of authorities and often ignoring context. Dales's insights are supported by the examples given above, with the "Aristotelian" Thomas as the most "Augustinian." Despite the apparent lack of Augustine's influence in the Aristotelian tradition, Augustine served as a foundational text for major philosophical questions. As Dales noted concerning the eternity of the world:
The three principle authors to whom medieval Latin philosophers were indebted for their knowledge of ancient thought on the eternity of the world were Plato, Augustine, and Boethius. Although others were recovered during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, these three were known uninterruptedly, and until the second quarter of the thirteen century they provided the context, the point of departure, and many of the stock arguments on both sides of the question. Even after the recovery of Aristotle's natural philosophy and the translation of medieval Jewish and Muslim works into Latin, these three authors maintained their preeminent position among the authorities.
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Augustine was likewise the foundational authority for philosophers holding to the unicity of the soul regarding the question of the rational soul, and for epistemologies relying on divine illumination. 103 In short, Augustine was a standard authority for various philosophical issues debated in the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries, despite the relative absence of Augustine from commentaries on Aristotle's works as such. In this light, one could say that with respect to high and late medieval philosophical literature, Augustine was cited as an authority without an attempt to philosophize in keeping with Augustine's thought. In other words, Augustine's authority and texts were foundational for philosophy, but in general no scholastic pursued natural philosophy based on a distinctive appropriation of Augustine.
There could however, be exceptions to this general rule. Henry of Ghent, for example, according to Raymond Macken, strove to give a satisfactory scientific foundation to the thought of his beloved Augustine. At the same time he represents a later evolution and a personal appropriation of Augustine's thought, influenced as well by some ideas of Aristotle, Avicenna, and other medieval scholastics. Indeed Henry's development of the Augustinian tradition assumes a personal and daring form. though Pasquale Porro has argued that the critical edition of Henry's works, still in progress, has necessitated a re-evaluation of Henry's traditional "Augustinianism," recognizing that Henry "sought to reconcile traditional Augustinian theories with some of the basic principles of Aristotelian epistemology and Avicennian ontology, thereby giving rise to a complex and original synthesis." 105 The relative lack of true appropriation of Augustine by the majority of scholastics could have been the result of the fact that Augustine did not have a place in the university curriculum, even though he did exert an influence in elementary education. 106 Grosseteste, therefore, fits within the general pattern of Augustine's reception with respect to medieval philosophical literature: there is no basis to claim that in this context Grosseteste had any special knowledge of Augustine at all. Augustine was, however, Grosseteste's primary authority in his theological works, as is evident not only in his Hexaemeron as seen above, but likewise in his De decem mandatis and Expositio in Epistolam Sancti Pauli ad Galatas. In his De decem mandatis, Grosseteste cited Augustine sixty-seven times, the overwhelming leader among Grosseteste's non-Scriptural authorities. Jerome is the next most frequently cited authority with sixteen citations. Of these sixty-seven, forty-seven give specific reference to the work and often book, though Grosseteste never gives references to chapters within books. Thirty, namely almost half, of the sixty-seven citations are found in Grosseteste's treatment of commandments eight through ten. De nuptiis et concupiscentia ad Valerium (nupt. et conc.) is the most frequently cited work of Augustine, Grosseteste having cited it ten times, followed by c. Iul. and ciu. each with seven citations, and five citations of various letters of Augustine. 107 Grosseteste cited from twenty-two separate works of Augustine, only six of which he did not name by title. 108 Three citations are unknown, meaning neither the editors nor myself could find the reference; 109 twice where Grosseteste cited Augustine without naming a work the editors have noted parallel passages as possible sources, once to trin., 110 and once to c. Iul.; 111 and as mentioned above, the editors offered four possibilities as the source(s) behind Grosseteste's citing Augustine secundum sentenciam Augustini. 112 The Hypomnesticon is the only Pseudo-Augustinian work Grosseteste cited in De decem mandatis, which he did twice.
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In short, Grosseteste demonstrated an impressive knowledge of Augustine's works in both breadth and depth. Moreover, he evidenced a facility with Augustine's texts that surpassed the mere citing of standard quotations. In De decem mandatis 9, for example, Grosseteste constructed his text by incorporating numerous quotations from Augustine. Thus, after introducing the theme of the ninth commandment, namely the one about not coveting your neighbor's wife, or house etc., Grosseteste began by quoting Galatians 5:17, even though he labeled it as Ephesians.
114 Then he quoted a phrase from c. Iul. 4.14. 65 Now the Augustinian theme of charity in practice as being the sole valid interpreter of the senses of Scripture . . . runs like a dominant theme through both works of Grosseteste, accompanied by the doctrine of amor ordinatus and the reduction of the commandments to one, which is inseparably the love of God and of the neighbor-the Johannine theme so beloved of Augustine.
125
Thus Grosseteste appealed to Augustine against Jerome regarding the question of justification through the law. In his Commentarius in Epistolam ad Galatas, Jerome had explained that "it is possible, therefore, that there is someone who is just and nevertheless is without faith in Christ." 126 Grosseteste denied that Jerome's true meaning was that one could become iustus sine fide, and he did so with Augustine as proof. 127 It is not just the number of citations of Augustine relative to other authorities that must be analyzed in order to discern Augustine's reception history; 131 Certainly Grosseteste did not begin reading Augustine in 1229/30, as his Tabula witnesses, but there is no evidence that he had acquired an extensive knowledge of Augustine's texts before this date, given the contents of his Physics Commentary and that on the Posterior Analytics. We must be careful not to read the clear influence of Augustine as evident in his later theological work back into his earlier philosophical works. Yet, we can say that by 1230, shortly after Helinand had completed his Chronicon, Grosseteste had acquired an erudite and extensive knowledge of Augustine, by reading Augustine's own works firsthand.
Conclusion
The foregoing allows us to draw four primary conclusions regarding the reception of Augustine as such in the thirteenth century. First is that, in order to discern Augustine's reception, we cannot rely on critical editions, which so often seek to nymus, firmiter credendum quod fides confertur gratis et non ex credentis praecedentibus bonis meritis." 128. Gross demonstrate the erudition of the editors rather than that of the authors being edited. Medieval authors chose when to cite Augustine and when not to, a fact that renders seeking Augustine's reception by means of explicit citation precarious.
Second, pseudo-Augustinian texts were received as authentic. For Grosseteste, as well as for Thomas and Lombard, the De fide ad Petrum was an authentic text of Augustine, even as Thomas recognized at times spurious attributions. What for us today is Pseudo-Augustinian, was for the thirteenth century genuine and authentic, and this must play a role in our understandings of Augustine's reception without allowing the hubris of our modern knowledge to affect our understandings of that reception in the thirteenth century: the thirteenth-century reception of pseudo-Augustinian texts is central to our understanding of the thirteenth-century reception of Augustine as such.
Third, it was only in the early fourteenth century that Augustine once again assumed the designation pater noster, a viewpoint that combines the academic scholarly erudition of Augustine's texts with a religio-cultural appropriation of Augustine as the model for the religious life. This, in turn, signals a qualitative and quantitative shift in the knowledge, use, and appropriation of Augustine. What we find in the thirteenth century is, to adapt the insight of Damasus Trapp, an Augustine without an Augustinianism. 132 Before the fundamental shift in Augustine's reception in the late medieval Augustinian Renaissance, Helinand, running ahead of the great scholastics, represented the apogee of Augustine's reception, as a product of the twelfth-century Augustinian Renaissance, and, as such, has far more to reveal to us about the "pre-scholastic" intellectual world than one might think a "mere" encyclopedist would. If we view Helinand as "only" an encyclopedist, or as "only" a "compiler," we will fail to understand Helinand, his work, and his world. The encyclopedists must be included in our investigations, interpretations, and portrayals of the intellectual history of the thirteenth century.
And finally, if we desire to understand the reception of Augustine in the Middle Ages, the thirteenth century is a pivotal period of transition, and was so even before the flowering of scholasticism in Paris. Yet if we desire to understand the reception of Augustine in the early thirteenth century, which provides the basis for any attempt to discern his influence or impact, we have our work cut out for us. We must ourselves return to the manuscripts and their marginalia, and we must do so with the recognition that citing Augustine in and of itself doesn't mean all that much. How was Augustine being cited? How was Augustine being used? How was Augustine known? What does Helinand's and Grosseteste's "cutting and pasting" of Augustine really mean aside from being an interesting observation? Somehow, Lombard's systematic compilation of Augustinian sententiae in his Sentences is more straightforward than that. In Lombard's wake, what are we to make of it all? Only with much further work, and much further pondering, will we come to a point at which we can begin to describe historically Augustine's reception in the early thirteenth century, something that is obviously necessary for any accurate and genuine understanding of the textual and intellectual history of the high and later Middle Ages. 
